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Abstract: This article examines recent theories of fictional characters, and raises
the issue of how far characters can be understood with reference to human inter-
subjectivity. On the one hand, empirical research based on theories of rhetorical
narrative ethics shows that phenomena such as sympathy and empathy are very
relevant for the ways readers describe their imaginative connection with fictional
characters. On the other hand, traditional narratology emphasizes that readers also
engage with fiction as an artefact. This article focuses on the similarities and
differences in these two conceptions of what engagement with fictional characters
is, and asks how much of what readers get out of fiction depends on what is
portrayed, and how much is the product of their enactment of form. Building on
some yet unpublished results of an empirical testing conducted earlier by Sklar, as
well as narratological and cognitive analyses of the concept of character, we
examine our respective theoretical intuitions and set out a cognitive-rhetorical
position that we both share. In that process we also clarify the ways in which
cognitive literary studies can speak to the larger purpose of reading.
Subjects: Literature; Interdisciplinary Literary Studies; Literary/Critical Theory; Science
Fiction
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1. Introduction
As teachers of literature frequently remind their students, fictional characters are not real people.
In this article, we examine this familiar tension between the ways that readers process fictional
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characters and the artifice of fiction. As a focus for that examination, we look at the results and
methodological implications of empirical testing, conducted by Sklar, on readers’ sympathy and
empathy. These unpublished results showed that adolescent Finnish readers felt sympathy for the
intellectually disabled protagonist in Daniel Keyes’s novel Flowers for Algernon. In this article, we
look at some of the results from that study, focusing particularly on the ways that readers
described their impressions of the character’s “personhood” and fictionality. These impressions
were complicated further by the fact that, in this particular case, the character’s life experience is
presumably far removed from the readers’ own. Yet, even framing the issue in terms of empathy
and sympathy seems to presuppose that readers are responding to actual people. Who are these
“people” that inhabit works of fiction? And what can testing readers’ responses to them tell us
about the role of literature in the real world?
Here, we attempt to address these questions by examining the theoretical assumptions each of
us hold concerning the concept of fictional character. On the one hand, empirical studies such as
this (see also Sklar, 2013a) are based on theories of rhetorical narrative ethics, and show that
phenomena such as sympathy and empathy are very relevant for the way readers describe their
imaginative connection with fictional characters. On the other hand, Polvinen (2017) has argued
that cognitive literary studies should not take such descriptions at face value, but should instead
think in terms of readers enacting the fiction as an artefact.1 We stage this negotiation between
data from Sklar’s study on the one hand and the traditional theories of characters within narratol-
ogy on the other, in order to examine the types of responses and ethical reflection that reading
fiction invites. In this way, the final aim is to clarify the ways in which cognitive literary studies can
speak to the larger purpose of reading.
2. Responding to a fictional character: the case of Charlie Gordon
When we read fiction, we sometimes are given intimate access to the thoughts and feelings of
characters in ways that would be impossible in our ordinary interactions with others. In fact,
authors often attempt to represent characters whose minds are significantly different from their
own, and in some cases different from those of most people. One particularly striking example of
this feature of fiction is Daniel Keyes’s 1966 novel Flowers for Algernon, a highly speculative study
of a particular kind of mind. The novel is comprised of short journal entries, or “progress reports,”
that the intellectually disabled narrator, Charlie Gordon, has been asked to write. The purpose of
these reports is to record the results of an experimental neurological operation that, if successful,
will make him highly intelligent. Charlie indeed develops a prodigious intellectual capacity, but not
before we are introduced to the character’s considerable cognitive limitations. In his first entry, for
instance, Charlie eagerly tells us, “I hope they use me becaus Miss Kinnian says mabye they can
make me smart. I want to be smart” (Keyes, 1994, p. 1). It is significant that Charlie identifies
himself, at least in this context, in terms of his incapacity. This is reinforced by Charlie’s description
of the scientists’ instructions, as well as the school that he attends: “I tolld dr Strauss and perfesser
Nemur I cant rite good but he says it dont matter he says I shud rite just like I talk and like I rite
compushishens in Miss Kinnians class at the beekmin collidge center for retarted adults where I go
to lern 3 times a week on my time off” (p. 1). Having framed the narrative directly around Charlie’s
cognitive difference, Keyes then provides a series of entries in which the protagonist describes the
mistreatment to which his coworkers subject him—mistreatment that Charlie, in his naivety,
mistakes for friendship. Eventually, as Charlie’s intelligence increases, his “friends” abandon him,
and he is left with the capacity to understand his situation, but without the emotional intelligence
to navigate relations with those, like his teacher, who actually do care about him. In this sense, the
novel presents a somewhat dystopian outcome for Charlie, in that it critiques the scientific
arrogance that led to this extreme experiment, while also tacitly lamenting his eventual return
to intellectual disability at the end of the novel.
Sklar (2013b, 2015), in analyzing the novel as a representation of intellectual disability,
identifies a number of features that are significant for the ways that minds different from
societal norms are understood by readers. Keyes’s device of having Charlie narrate his own
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thoughts in written notes solicited by the scientists, while considerably less self-revealing than
an “interior monologue” (see Cohn, 1978, p. 182), nevertheless provides elements of stream of
consciousness, in that Charlie, in relating the events that occur in the novel, occasionally records
thoughts that randomly occur to him. As a result, Keyes provides a detailed portrait of
a particular character’s mind (see Sklar, 2013b, p. 49). This mind, in the early phases of the
novel, reflects a certain type of thinking that (stereo)typically tends to be associated with people
with intellectual disabilities (Halliwell, 2004; Marchbanks, 2006; Sklar, 2013b, 2015). In addition,
the novel’s representation2 of Charlie’s mental development implies an underlying suggestion of
consciousness that readers are presumed to extrapolate, intuit, and/or apply to their mental
and emotional realization of the character as a rounded individual (Sklar, 2013b, pp. 49–50).
Despite the detailed and sympathetic portrait of intellectual disability that Keyes has rendered,
the pitiable quality of Charlie’s disability (Sklar, 2013b, pp. 56–57), and the “dystopian” quality of
his regression from hyper-intelligence to disability towards the end of the novel (pp. 55–59),
raise questions about what kind of an enactment readers are asked to perform with this novel,
and what kinds of ideas about intellectual disability they walk away with.
For all of these reasons, “Charlie Gordon” provides a rich test case with which to examine readers’
responses to fictional characters, both theoretically and empirically. In Flowers for Algernon, readers
are prompted to enact Charlie’s thoughts and experiences; they are persuaded to sympathize with his
aspirations and struggles; and they are invited to imagine his life as an intellectually disabled man. In
addition, the straightforward style of his narration makes the narrative accessible to a wide variety of
readers, beginning in mid-adolescence. In light of this accessibility, how do actual readers respond to
a character like Charlie Gordon? In the sections that follow, we will examine the responses of
adolescents who participated in testing conducted by Sklar, in order to analyze some of the ways
that readers actually think and feel about the character. We will then consider what these responses
suggest about the ways readers generally conceptualize characters in fiction.
3. Testing readers’ responses to Charlie Gordon
3.1. Participants
The previous section outlined Charlie’s characterization, and hypothesized about some of the
features in the novel that might shape readers’ responses to him. Some of these hypotheses
were tested by Sklar in a study involving approximately 200 readers between the ages of 14 and
18. The testing was conducted in two upper secondary and two lower secondary schools in the
Helsinki region of Finland. The majority of the respondents were Finnish native speakers, although
roughly half of the participants were students in English-language programs. For this reason,
students in English-language programs—slightly more than half of the respondents—read an
excerpt from the novel in the original English and responded in English, while the remaining
participants read an excerpt in Finnish from a published translation by Pekkanen (Keyes, 1985)
and wrote their answers in Finnish. For the purposes of the present discussion, we will focus
primarily on the ideas expressed by those who responded to the original text in English.3
3.2. Tests
The study involved three tests in all: a pretest, the reading test proper, and a post-test. With the
exception of a control group, participants were given a pretest consisting of a standard, although
sometimes challenged (see Polvinen, 2017), measure of empathy and sympathy, Davis’s
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; see Davis, 1983), in order to determine respondents’ predis-
positions towards feeling sympathy and empathy for others in their everyday lives. In addition,
following the reading test, participants were given a post-test in which they reported their
experiences with, and knowledge of, people with intellectual disabilities, their feelings towards
such individuals, and their prior exposure to fictional works (novels, films, etc.) that included
characters of this type. This post-test aimed to determine, especially, whether or not prior experi-
ence with and/or knowledge of people with intellectual disabilities affected their responses
towards the protagonist in Flowers.
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The reading test itself instructed participants to read Charlie’s “progress reports” 1–4 and 6—in
other words, five of the first six chapters in the novel (roughly eight pages in total, in both English
and Finnish). The first four “reports” provide a considerable amount of detail about Charlie’s way of
thinking, his aspirations, his fears, and his relationships with others. The sixth chapter describes an
incident in which he is misled by his friends but does not realize that they are mistreating him.
Following the reading of the selected text, participants responded to seven questions, the aim of
which was to determine, among other things, (a) if readers identified the narrator-protagonist as
intellectually disabled, (b) what this identification means to individual readers, (c) how they feel
towards this particular intellectually disabled character, and (d) whether or not the fictional status
of the character influenced their responses to him. The questions included the following:
(1) How would you describe the person telling the story?
(2) Is there anything particular that you believe makes him unusual? Why?
(3) According to the narrator, how do others think or feel about him? Give examples.
(4) According to the narrator, how do others treat him? Give examples.
(5) Do you think that the way that he is treated by others is fair? Explain your answer.
(6) Based on what you have read, what do you feel about the person who is telling the
story? Why?
(7) Does the fact that this is a fictional story affect the way that you think or feel about the
person telling the story? Why/why not?
3.3. Methods
The methodology for the testing was patterned after a prior study of reader sympathy conducted
by Sklar (2013a). In that earlier study, participants were also administered the IRI as a pretest,
before reading short stories in which they were hypothesized to feel sympathy for characters who
either initially appeared “unsympathetic,” or about whom less flattering details were revealed later
in the narrative. The aim in administering the IRI as a pretest was to determine if readers’
predisposition to feel sympathy in their everyday lives, as measured by the IRI, affected their
inclination to feel sympathy towards the characters.
Also in that study, as in the present one, the distinction between sympathy and empathy was
defined according to the prevailing usage in the field of social psychology. Empathy is understood
here as involving the apprehension of the emotional or cognitive experience of another—“an
affective response more appropriate to another’s situation than one’s own” (Myyry, 2003, p. 10).
On the other hand, sympathy involves feeling for the experience of another. More specifically, Sklar
(2013a, pp. 26–36) defined sympathy as involving four components:
(1) The awareness of the suffering of another as “something to be alleviated” (Wispé, 1986,
p. 318).
(2) Frequently, the judgment that the suffering of another is undeserved or unfair.
(3) Negative, unpleasant or uncomfortable feelings on behalf of the sufferer (“sympathetic
distress”: see Hoffman, 2000, pp. 95).
(4) The desire to help, even if that inclination is not acted on.
Since all of the responses provided by participants were in the form of open-ended answers, Sklar
developed a list of possible responses that might be scored as “sympathy,” including, among
others, “I feel sympathy for him,” “I feel compassion for him,” “I feel sorry for him,” and so forth.
Similarly, participants’ identification of Charlie as intellectually disabled was determined by
a variety of responses, such as “simple,” “dependent like a child,” “mentally retarded,” “intellec-
tually disabled,” “learning disabled,” and other terms. From the participant responses, the four
research assistants who scored the tests were instructed to determine whether or not
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respondents had expressed sympathy for the character, and whether or not they had identified
him as intellectually disabled. These responses were coded for reliability by two of the research
assistants.
3.4. Results and discussion
The combination of the first two questions—“How would you describe the person telling the story?”
and “Is there anything particular that you believe makes him unusual?”—resulted in 85.7% of the
participants identifying Charlie as intellectually disabled. From this, it can be surmised that Charlie’s
intellectual disability is quite easy to identify in the selected text, and that the text foregrounds
certain features that readers associate with intellectual disability. In addition—and critical, it seems,
to readers’ feelings towards the character—59.2% identified his treatment by others as “unfair,” and
another 23.7% gave mixed responses, indicating that they identified some degree of unfairness.
It is perhaps unsurprising, in light of this assessment of his treatment by others, that 59.1% of
respondents claimed to feel some degree of sympathy for Charlie.4 This is particularly noteworthy,
since no other emotional response, including empathy, occurred with significant frequency, despite
the alleged role of first-person narratives in generating this response.5 Thus, there can be little doubt
that a significant number of readers feel for (sympathize with) Charlie’s situation, even if they are
unable to feelwith (empathize with) him. Based on cross-table and chi2 tests that were run between a
combination of questions #1 and #2 (identifying his intellectual disability) and question #6 (on their
sympathy for him), it was determined that readers’ sympathy for the character did not seem to
depend on the awareness of Charlie’s disability, but appeared in responses from both those who did
identify that feature and those who did not [p = 0.136]. A similar result was found both for those
respondents who had prior experience with people with intellectual disabilities, and for those who did
not [p = 0.161]. These findings may suggest that, if readers are supplied with enough textual evidence
to identify the suffering of another, they are able to feel sympathy, whether or not it is connected to
that character’s intellectual disability and/or readers’ prior contact with this population.
Based on an ANOVA test that was run between the IRI and the reading test, however, those who
scored highly on the IRI sympathy scale were significantly more likely to report feeling sympathy
for Charlie [F(1, 165) = 7.13, p = 0.008]. In addition, an ANOVA test was run between question #5,
regarding Charlie’s unfair treatment, and readers’ sympathy for the character, and these were also
found to be significantly related [F(3, 163), p = 0.006]. The results of these two ANOVA tests
suggest that people who view themselves as sympathetic in their everyday lives (as measured by
the IRI sympathy scale), as well as those who are sensitized to the unfair treatment of others, are
more likely to feel sympathy for Charlie than other readers.
At the same time, though, the fact that large percentages of readers identified Charlie’s intellectual
disability and/or felt sympathy for him masks considerable variation in the substance of those
responses. For example, as noted earlier, responses that were categorized as “intellectual disability”
included a broad range of terms—some very clinical or medical (“mental disability,” “disabled,”
“lower IQ”), some more colloquial but socially acceptable (“not clever,” “not good at problem
solving”), and others quite derogatory, whether intended or not (“retarded,” “stupid,” “dumb”). Two
excerpts from the answers to question #1 will help to illustrate the nuances of meaning that can be
lost by grouping the responses under the heading of “intellectual disability”:6
[210062, age 15]: “The person is a mentally disabled man who works in a bakery. He is 32
years old. He seems like a very nice and honest man who tries to please the people who are
being nice to him.”
[13062, age 16]: “He is special, a little bit dumb and definitely unhappy. His words suggest that
he is a hard worker, because he believes that he needs to work in order to achieve something.”
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While the two responses highlight similar aspects of his disability and experience, there is
a different tone between the two. The first respondent appears to accept Charlie on his own
terms (“He seems like a very nice and honest man”), with the disability forming only one feature of
his identity; the second, on the other hand, seems to emphasize information provided by the text
as evidence of his difference. Indeed, the second respondent seems more attuned to the evidence
provided by the character’s words than to any larger conception of his “personhood.”
We find a similar range in participants’ feelings towards the character. Again, while the category
“sympathy” has been used to reflect a variety of descriptive terms used by readers, there are
shades of difference between these terms that reveal significant distinctions between respon-
dents’ answers. These fine differences, as well as the degree to which readers seemed actively
aware of the fictional status of the object of their feelings, can be illustrated by another compar-
ison between two responses to question #6:
[210062, age 15]: “I feel very sorry for him as he is not treated nicely. Although he is
mentally challenged he seems to be very lovable and sympathetic.”
[24232, age 15]: “I think the narrator is pretty naïve, which earns him sympathy from me. He
doesn’t understand when people joke about him or use him as a personal clown.”
While in the first response the participant relates the experience as though s/he were describing an
actual person, the second is more analytical: their sympathy is based on an overt evaluation of the
unfair way in which the character is treated by others, especially in light of his naïveté. More
significantly, perhaps, in their reference to the narrator, the second participant seems especially
aware of the fictive frame of which Charlie is a part.
The anticipation that readers might divide along similar lines—between those who regarded the
character as though he were a person, and those for whom the fictionality of the narrative more
overtly affected their experience of the story—led Sklar to include the final question in his survey,
asking participants whether they had been affected by Charlie’s fictional status. A significant
majority of participants (63.5%) claimed that the fact of the character’s fictionality did not affect
their experiences because they felt that the narrative itself was realistic, while a minority (21.8%)
felt that the fictional status of the character played a role in their responses (14.7% had no
opinion). In between these two poles, readers expressed a range of responses that emphasize or
deemphasize the novel’s status as a fiction. This variety raises two important questions: How “real”
is Charlie to these readers, and how might these responses to Keyes’s narrative help us understand
the ways that readers conceptualize and respond to fictional characters?
4. Theorizing fictional characters
Despite its speculative features, Flowers for Algernon is primarily a realistic work of fiction. In this
sense, it invites readers to approach its characters as though they are human, and to use the full
palette of emotional and ethical sensibilities in response to them—a view that is echoed in literary
theory. For narratologist Uri Margolin (2007, p. 66), for example, “‘character’ designates any entity,
individual or collective—normally human or human-like—introduced in a work of narrative fiction.”
This definition directly points to the crux of our discussion, firstly by describing characters as “normally
human or human-like,” and secondly by immediately limiting the phenomenon to fictional texts. Our
discussion in the following pages takes up these two elements of character, and by interlacing
theoretical issues with participants’ responses to question #7 about fictionality in Sklar’s question-
naire, we aim to hone in on why character is such a conundrum for cognitive literary scholars.
Often, the way fictional characters are conceptualized follows a division between what could be
called mimetic and structuralist theories of literature. The first of these sees character as human-
like, as non-actual yet recognizably individual persons. The second tradition, on the other hand,
takes character strictly as a textual object and a literary artefact. According to such a division,
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cognitive studies of literary characters tend to fall under the mimetic branch—either because they
follow the modal logic of possible people in possible worlds (see e.g. Carroll, 1990; Walton, 1990),
or because they focus on the ways that readers build on folk-psychological knowledge about
human experience and behavior (see e.g. Oatley, 2011; Sanford & Emmott, 2012). The narratolo-
gical tradition, on the other hand, with its roots in structuralism and rhetoric, could be said to draw
on the assumptions of the second branch, and to take character as an artistic construct fulfilling
some function (e.g. protagonist, helper, antagonist, etc.) in the text as a whole (see e.g. Greimas,
1987; Genette, 1980).
We want to lend support to attempts made to blend these two traditions by building on
a cognitive-rhetorical theory of literary characters. Within rhetorical narratology, James Phelan
(1989, 2007) has long argued for the presence of three different aspects to fictional texts: the
mimetic, the thematic and the synthetic. These aspects also form for Phelan the components of
character, allowing characters to be a) life-like, b) representative of the central idea of the fiction,
and c) to function as parts of the artefact constructed by the author. On the basis of Phelan’s
components, Varis (2019) has recently argued for a cognitive-enactive theory that underlines the
multifaceted nature of characters through an analogy to Frankenstein’s Monster: they are both
alive and not, both human and not. Our “fictional cousins,” Varis (2019, p. 83) argues, are “dynamic
constructions that constantly negotiate mimetic humanity and unavoidable artificiality as well as
elusive, inferred lives and multimodal, repeatable bodies.” It is thus not necessary to decide
between taking characters as “skillfully crafted plot mechanisms or as startlingly relatable mock-
humans because they are, by definition, both” (Varis, 2019, p. 74, see also Schneider, 2001). In the
remaining portion of this article, we consider how readers’ engagement with characters might be
conceptualized, if we define fictional characters in this rhetorically and cognitively inflected way.
However, much of the theoretical discussion on characters, as well as individual readers’
verbalized responses to them, still follow the traditional parlance of describing characters as either
human (focusing on the mimetic) or as textual and functional (focusing on the synthetic and
thematic). A brief examination of the substance of further responses to Sklar’s questionnaire may
shed some light on the qualities that readers expect in identifying a character as “real,” as well as
some of the features of the narrative that elicited comments about the constructed nature of
Charlie as a character. The sampling of answers below is taken from a single class of 17- and 18-
year-olds in an English-language school in Helsinki, in which most students were native speakers of
Finnish.
4.1. Mimetic approaches to characters
The final question Sklar asked about Charlie in Flowers for Algernon was: “Does the fact that this is
a fictional story affect the way that you think or feel about the person telling the story? Why/why
not?” While the responses given should not be taken as monolithic positions held by individual
readers, many of them express a clear mimetic alignment between the reader’s sympathy with
Charlie and that character’s relation to reality. A clear example of this can be found in the
following response:
“It [the fact that it is fiction] does not [affect me], even though I know it is fiction I still
imagine him living in the real world since retardation is a mental handicap many people do,
in reality as well, live with. People are treated unfairly in real life too.” [11092, age 17]
This response draws on real-life knowledge to validate the authenticity of the content of the
narrative. It relies on the similarity between the narrative and real life in understanding the work’s
meaning, and suggests that during reading the character is imagined as part of reality. It also
carries the idea that one might find such a character in real life—something that other responses
focused on as well:
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“No it does not [affect me] because this story can well be a real life example of someone, so
this can really happen. So whether it is a fictional or a nonfictional story it does not matter
since the feelings and emotions would still be the same to the person if this happens and
same for me too.” [13102, age 17]
“Even though this is a fictional story, it evokes a lot of emotions and makes me feel a lot of
empathy towards the main character. This story very possibly [might] be true for some
people to a certain degree, especially because the story is told in a very realistic manner.”
[13092, age 17]
Both of these responses seem to imply that, at least in this narrative, fiction provides examples of
general truths about life in the Aristotelian sense (see Nussbaum, 1990), even when the story is not
related directly to real-world events. The second response notes the fact that the story is narrated
(“is told”), but stays focused on its realism and generalizability.
Since the text used in this testing involves a character with disabilities, many responses also
focused on Charlie specifically as a representative of a group of real-life individuals:
“Fiction or not, the situation depicted in this story is one that happens more often than it
should also in real life. People with developmental disabilities are treated badly, because of
the stigma that comes with having something unusual or ‘wrong’ with the mind. While
Charlie may not exist, he represents the under-represented, so my feelings don’t change, as
they would just transfer to a larger group of people.” [11082, age 17]
This response also points to similarities between the fiction and real life, and even suggests the
notion that readers might “transfer” their “feelings” to the larger, real-life group that the character
represents.7 Implicit in this response, again, is the realistic nature of the narrative.
Other responses conceived of Charlie as existing in a space that some theorists (Harvey, 1965;
Yanal, 1999) have described as “parallel” to the real world. As readers, we cannot affect the
fictional world, even when our experience of that world is similar or parallel to our own:
“Yes. Because a fictional character is impossible to help, you have to just stand there and
observe, keep on reading. You feel bad, because you cannot help the character.” [13062, age 17]
Yanal (1999, p. 123), as an aesthetic philosopher, attempts to explain the so-called “paradox of
fiction”—the seeming irrationality of responding emotionally to characters that we know to be
fictional—by suggesting that such responses are “richly generated,” to the extent that “what we
have is real pity that must be kept to oneself, real anger that is forever ineffectual, real love that is
never to be returned.” Similarly, this response emphasizes what we are unable to do or affect,
because the character is fictional. Like Yanal’s hypothetical reader whose “real pity” is thwarted by
the fact that it “must be kept to oneself,” this reader clearly finds the differences between the
fictional and real worlds frustrating, in that they wish that they could “help the character,” because
the inability to do so makes them “feel bad.” In other words, they never lose sight of the fact that it
is a work of fiction, but are not actively focusing on that aspect of the experience.
An important variant of the inactivity response appears when the text is not compared to real-
world events, but to nonfiction texts:
“It doesn’t affect my thoughts too much, as a true story that would be written down would
look the same on paper. Also, there probably is someone in the world with a similar story to
his.” [11102, age 18]
This response also emphasizes the realism of the work, but specifically by noting the similarities
between fictional texts and nonfictional texts. And as with fictional stories, we are unable to
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intervene in nonfictional narratives, either (see Sklar, 2013a, pp. 9–22). Of course, this reader
seems unaware of the fact that the storyline depends on medical speculation, and that both the
surgery described in it and the full arc of Charlie’s story are impossible. It is difficult to say, though,
whether this is due to the fact that the participants only read a short excerpt from the novel, which
offers only a relatively minimal “degree of departure” (see Ryan, 1980; see also Christiansen in this
Special Issue) from real life, or, as noted earlier, it results from Keyes’s consistent emphasis on the
consciousness of the protagonist.
Some readers recognize that what they know about the character is limited by what has been
included in the extract:
“Not particularly because the extract is the only thing I know about him. It is as such
irrelevant whether he is real. In reality I might fear for the outcome of his operation more.”
[11112, age 18]
Here, the respondent's inclination to attribute particular qualities to the character—and especially
the character’s mind—is bound by what the text provides, and that fictionality affects what they
bring to the text from their own experiences. Within cognitive literary studies Marco Caracciolo
(2014) emphasizes such cognitive construction of characters, and notes that while many elements
in relating to characters and real people are the same, “the originating experience—the charac-
ter’s—is created by readers in the interaction with the text” (Caracciolo, 2014, p. 117). This tension
between real-world experience and responses to fictional characters becomes more visible in the
responses to Charlie that we quote in our next section.
4.2. Thematic and synthetic approaches to characters
In Emotion and the Structure of Narrative Film the psychologist and media scholar Ed S. Tan (1996,
p. 2) notes that cinematic audiences “know full well that what they are seeing is a fictional world
created by means of an artefact.” The theoretical views he goes on to develop in the book about
the emotions experienced by such audiences take that awareness of artificiality as a given, and
assume that viewers have emotions both about the fictional world and about the fiction as an
artefact. The narratologists James Phelan and Peter Rabinowitz (2012), for their part, combine
Phelan’s three components of character (mimetic, thematic and synthetic) with the various
audiences posited in the rhetorical model of narrative communication: “Our interest in the mimetic
component is a function of our participation in the narrative audience, which takes the events in
a fiction as history and the characters as real people,” they argue, whereas “our interest in the
synthetic component is a function of our participation in the authorial audience, which seeks to
discern the underlying constructive purpose of the story as a whole” (Phelan & Rabinowitz, 2012,
p. 115). Readers drawn to the thematic component, on the other hand, combine the other two (p.
115). Both Tan’s and Phelan and Rabinowitz’s framings of readerly interests offer explanations for
the differences that readers—including the respondents in Sklar’s questionnaire and the two
authors of this article—have in their own reading experiences (and subsequent theoretical
leanings).
The data provided in Sklar’s study reveals the assumptions—largely mimetic—that most of
these readers had when encountering Charlie in Flowers for Algernon. Furthermore, the minority
of participants who focused on the unreality of Keyes’s storyworld also report a sense that their
connection to the character is, indeed, affected by that unreality:
“It [the fictionality of the work] does [make a difference to how I think or feel], because
I [know] the operation of making a person smarter is not possible.” [13072, age 17]
In this instance, the respondent is clearly conscious of the counterfactuality of the narrative,
although it is less clear whether that awareness leads them to read it specifically within the
genre frame of speculative fiction, or exactly how that speculative frame would affect their
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emotional connection to the character. In any case, this response focuses on Charlie’s story as
a construction, even if it does not explicitly speak of issues such as genre conventions and
rhetorical techniques, which would be the purview of the “fully” synthetic perspective (see
Phelan, 1989, p. 14).
Some of the responses explicitly aware of fictionality also adopt the vocabulary of cognitive-
emotional distance (see Kuijpers et al., 2017, p. 41–42), as is the case in our final example:
“Yes. Fiction is a creation of the author, therefore it is easy to distance yourself from the
character. The work exists to explore ideas, such as in this case the morals of taking
advantage of a mentally disabled person.” [11132, age 18]
Here, the reader emphasizes the fictionality of the narrative, as well as its supposed function as
a thought experiment “exploring” a particular ethical issue—what Herman (2003) calls “a tool for
thinking.” In this sense, characters in fiction exist primarily to activate a particular type of thinking
in readers, rather than as individuals to sympathize or empathize with.
Thus, while many of these responses do offer support for the idea that readers encounter
characters as people, rather than non-personified textual constructs, some of them also show
awareness of Charlie as a fictional being. Those few who do so, also adopted the vocabulary of
thought experiments and distance, following the rationalist intuition that disbelief in the char-
acter’s existence lessens readers’ connection to them. However, it is important to distinguish
between the suggestion that readers actually believe in the “reality” of characters, and the
continuum of “active” belief in which readers retain some awareness of its fictionality (Yanal,
1999, pp. 104–105; Sklar, 2013a, pp. 14–15). On the other hand, our ability to maintain such
a seemingly contradictory engagement with fictions is, others have argued (e.g. Landy, 2012;
Polvinen, 2012; Schaeffer 2010), only made conceptually feasible by letting go of the idea that
emotional engagement requires some form of belief—or suspension of disbelief—in the fiction.8
It should also be kept in mind that empirical studies always run the risk of guiding the
participants’ reactions in questionnaires, even when studies are conducted as carefully and openly
as possible. In our particular case, it is possible that the lack of focus by respondents on the
synthetic is due to the fictionality question having been presented after a series of mimesis-
oriented questions that emphasize Charlie as a person telling his own story and that ask the
participants to comment on the ontological fiction/nonfiction distinction, rather than on the form
of the construction per se. But even if the questions do not direct readers towards particular types
of responses, the fact remains that respondents are likely to fall back in their answers on
vocabulary and conceptual structures they have adopted through long years of discussing reading
experiences with parents, in schools and in reading groups (e.g. Fialho, Zyngier, & Miall, 2011;
Fialho in this Special Issue). That language is itself often tied to particular metaphorical structures
of anthropomorphism, naturalization and belief that may obstruct other, more synthetic and
structure-oriented reactions (Polvinen, 2017; see also Christiansen in this Special Issue). In order
to eventually get around this tendency in readers’ approaches to fiction, cognitive literary theory
can play a role in making sure that the conceptualizations on which our literary education is based
include both the mimetic and the thematic and synthetic aspects of characters, and that all
readers, whether scholars or not, have a rich vocabulary for describing their reactions.
Whether readers do or do not experience characters through belief structures, and how their
emotional attachment to those characters is constructed in either case, is an issue that also has
consequences for how we envision the cognitive benefits of literature. In what follows, we turn to
look at the debates around the purpose of fiction, and around the role of cognitive literary studies
in making those benefits visible.
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5. Fictional characters and the purpose of cognitive literary studies
In the contemporary discussion around the role of literature in society, one argument most often
made is that reading literary fiction increases (or at least correlates with) the ability for empathy
and sympathy (see e.g. Hakemulder, 2000; Kidd & Castano, 2013; Mumper & Gerrig, 2017; for
critiques, see Keen, 2007, pp. 84–95; Kuzmičová, Mangen, Støle, & Begnum, 2017; Samur, Tops, &
Koole, 2018). Others (Koopman & Hakemulder, 2015; Nussbaum, 1990; Sklar, 2013a, 2015) suggest
that our emotional engagement with characters enables us to reflect on the ethical consequences
of our perceptions of, and interactions with, people in our everyday lives. Such arguments build on
mimetic theories to the extent that characters have features that draw on our experience of real
people, making the bridge from emotions felt for fictional characters to the emotions felt for real
individuals a short one. The structuralist-semiotic theories, on the other hand, might be seen to run
the risk of increasing that distance, and thereby cutting literature off from the rest of the world and
from any possible benefits to the reading public.
However, rather than posing the question in a binary, either human-like or synthetic opposition,
the two authors of this article together prefer to argue for the more nuanced position suggested by
Phelan, and to identify in characters the mimetic, thematic and synthetic components. By doing so,
and thinking of characters as walking, talking, human-shaped constructions or feeling fabrications,
we find that, far from losing the conduit between literature and the world, a multidimensional view
of fictional characters allows for a wide range of possible engagements. As long as life-likeness is
seen as the only or even the most attractive quality of fiction, discussions on the purpose of
literature will also be trapped in a discourse where the only way for literature to have an effect in
the world is to present its readers with “more world” by increasing the number of human
individuals that we have the opportunity to meet (see Phelan, 1989, p. 14). Thus, a continued
emphasis on the mimetic qualities of characters may, in fact, make fiction seem inadequate as a
vehicle for representation, since fictional individuals will never attain the ontological status of real
people, however deeply we experience them.
Even if fiction is not seen to be speaking directly of the world, it could be understood to offer
a different perceptual angle on the real minds we meet. By providing access to fictional minds in
a way that is not possible in reality (Cohn, 1999), literature also informs our sense of humanity. The
possible benefits of fiction to empathy and sympathy could be seen to reside not in the characters
themselves, but in readers’ cognitive action in imagining those characters. Many scholars have in
the past taken such action as a form of simulation, where the experiences of characters are
processed in an off-line fashion in readers’ minds (see e.g. Currie, 1997; Oatley, 1999). From our
perspective, though, such a view easily leads to regarding the emotions generated by reading as
some form of “quasi-emotion,” a term used by Walton to describe the “physiological-psychological
state” produced by fictional situations, as distinct from the “genuine” emotions that we experience
in real life (1990, 196). With partial support in the responses presented above, we argue instead
that “readerly engagements” (Phelan, 2007, p. 3) span the full spectrum of real emotions—they
just involve different saliences than engagement directed towards the real world would.
Further support for this view of engaged readerly action can be found in the framework of
enactive cognition (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). According to enactive cognition, all inter-
action of a living being with its environment is a form of cognition, where autonomous agents
“actively generate and maintain their identities, and thereby enact or bring forth their own
cognitive domains” (Colombetti & Thompson, 2008, p. 55). That “bringing forth” of a cognitive
domain remains central to actions such as movement (towards a more beneficial environment),
perception (of potential benefits and hazards) and self-reflection (or the ability to perceive oneself
in a particular place, state and situation). Some of the literary applications of the central ideas of
enactive cognition focus on the ways in which readers can be said to be vicariously living with the
actions of the characters within the fictional world (imagining emotions, sensations and bodily
movement; see e.g. Caracciolo, 2014; Fialho in this Special Issue), and that in itself may well hold
the kinds of ethical benefits that studies on readerly empathy have identified.
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However, fiction may, in fact, also offer us a very different kind of cognitive-emotional benefit—
one that depends on our engagement with the literary artefact as a whole, and with the fictional
characters specifically as fictions. The enactive (or more widely, 4E cognitive) theories of literature
have described readerly processing by combining two reader models: one the embodied, mimeti-
cally-oriented reader, the other the plot-oriented reader envisioned by Wolfgang Iser, whose focus
is on the structures of storytelling present in the text (Kukkonen, 2014). Here, as with Phelan and
Rabinowitz’s rhetorical model, the idea is that readers take various perspectives while reading, and
thus building a character also involves several aspects. Firstly, there is the “Principle of Minimal
Departure” (Ryan, 1980) whereby the fictional human differs from the reader’s experience of real-
world persons only when this is expressly signaled by the text. Secondly, the reader’s imaginative
action takes place in interaction with the textual elements that engage in such signaling. Thus,
characters are generated by a complex combination of textual guidance and real-life experience—
always keeping in mind that real-life experience itself should also include our experience of
character types, genre conventions, and story arcs (Mikkonen, 2014).
Rather thanpresentingwindows to reality, then, fictionsofferusaquitedifferent cognitive ecology (see
Hutchins, 1995) in which to imagine. In that ecology our everyday cognitive skills, including actions such
as reading characters’ minds (Zunshine, 2006), are certainly in use, but they are engaging with an
environment that also presents other affordances (see Gibson, 1979) than those offered to us by reality.
For example, TerenceCave (2016) suggests that like the precise language of apoem redescribes reality in
a way that cannot be paraphrased, the “cognitively enriched fiction offers a mode of intelligence—at
once kinesic and reflective—not available to other kinds of discourse” (p. 132; see also Tangerås and
Skjerdingstad in this Special Issue). The readingof fiction is anactivity, Caveargues, that allows readers to
be mimetically and synthetically engaged with the bodies and minds of characters, as well as with the
structures of the written artefact. Karin Kukkonen (2019) has termed the interaction between the text
and our reading minds as “designed sensory flow,” which is enacted as spaces, events, meanings and
characters. The enactive position, therefore, emphasizes first of all fiction’s artefactuality in tandemwith
its world-likeness, and secondly the idea that fictions offer us a very particular kind of dynamic sensory
environment. Part of that environment is designed to engage our knowledge of persons, but since the
interface between us and the sensory flow is specifically not reality, that knowledge is always affected by
our understanding of how the interface itself works (Polvinen, 2016).
Several years ago, narratologist David Herman (2011) argued against the idea of narrative fiction
having an exceptional ability to portrayminds, and that, instead, what it does is engage ourminds in the
same processes, with the same kind of accuracy, as everydaymind-reading. The enactive viewdescribed
above follows instead the conclusions of Kukkonen and Skov Nielsen (2018), who—from their respective
cognitive and narratological positions—suggest that reading fiction is, indeed, exceptional. The literary
artefact with which our mind-reading abilities interact affords forms of engagement (e.g. undisputed
access to a character’s mind through internal focalization) that are different from our everyday interac-
tions with people. While in the case of a first-person narrative such as Keyes’s the connection with the
fictional mind is more similar to everyday storytelling, and themimetic focus in the responses discussed
above reflects that fact, narrative fiction retains an exceptional potential for engaging our minds in the
guided imagining, rather than the direct perception, of characters. Such imagining may also have the
consequence of increasing our awareness of the task that fiction sets for its readers: to go through the
seemingly contradictory mental process of engaging with fictional characters as fictional characters.
While it is the task of empirical studies to reveal the extent to which such “self-modifying reading”
happens (Fialho in this Special Issue; see also Koek, Janssen, Hakemulder, & Rijlaarsdam, 2019), con-
tinued theoreticalwork is also needed to sharpen the conceptual structure onwhich the empiricalwork is
based. It is here that the expertise of cognitive literary studies can help to clarify the purpose of fiction.
6. Conclusion
In this article, our aim has been to see whether the different scholarly traditions on how readers
interact with characters—one emphasizing the mimetic and the other the synthetic—might find
common ground in cognitive literary studies. On the one hand, an analysis of the detail and variety
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of responses from readers to the character of Charlie gave firmer foundation for the kind of
theorizing that often restates the theorist’s preconceived ideas and individual experiences about
how fiction works. On the other hand, that analysis also put theoretical pressure on the expres-
sions used both by respondents and theorists about how we read, and showed that some of the
concepts behind such expressions—such as “belief,” or indeed “character”—might be rethought to
be more compatible with our current knowledge of cognitive processing.
Furthermore,wehave tried to seehow readerly engagementswith fictional characterswork as aprism
through which we can better understand what is at stake in debates around the purpose of literature.
While itmay seem that promoting the idea of literature as an enacted artefact, rather than as amirror of
reality, strips usof useful tools in thedebates around the valueof fiction, that problemdoesnot arise ifwe
first of all step away from the idea thatwhat fiction offers its readers ismost of allmore reality. Instead, if
we start our work by promoting literature as enactive imagining that offers its readers cognitive benefits
tied to its form in addition to its content, the artefactuality of fictional characters no longer appears as an
obstacle, but insteadaspart of theexceptionality of fictional narratives thatmakes themvaluable tous in
the first place.
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Notes
1. “Enactment” is here understood as a cognitive process
whereby the world perceived by an individual is
brought forth in an interaction wherein the individual is
understood to actively explore their environment
rather than just passively receive stimuli from it
(Caracciolo, 2014; Varela et al., 1991).
2. In the present discussion, the term “representation” is
used to refer to the written narrative, as distinct from
how readers might process it through their attributions
and enactments of the character’s consciousness.
3. A later comparison between the original and the Finnish
translation raised a number of questions about the
differences between the two texts, and whether or not
it was even possible to combine the data from the
Finnish responses with that from the English responses.
This will be investigated further at a later date.
4. See Sklar (2013a, p. 28, 35) for a discussion of how
readers’ sympathy for a character can be affected by
their judgment that the character’s situation is
“unfair.”
5. See Keen (2007, pp. 96–99) for a discussion of theories
that have speculated on the role of “narrative situa-
tion” in reader response.
6. Note that simple mistakes in spelling have been
silently corrected for fluency.
7. Currie (1990, p. 188) calls this theory the “transfer
strategy,” which he rejects on the grounds that there
may not be a group in all real-life situations to which
we can transfer the emotions that we experience while
reading.
8. Such a position is also indicated already in Tan’s work
on cinema, and while he there (1996, p. 154) explicitly
veers away from studying the details of what kind of
a cognitive model would make it possible for charac-
ter-related and artefact-related emotions to coexist,
later work by Tan et al. (2017) sees the solution in
layers of conscious attention.
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